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The account as outlined in the main article makes a number of simplifying 
assumptions. This supplement considers the result of relaxing some of those 
assumptions. Additionally, we consider situations where the integration of multiple 
cues may be useful, rather than detrimental, and briefly explore alternative accounts 
of the reported effects. 
Simplifying Assumptions 
 Symmetrical diagnosticity. In the worked example given in the main body of 
text, we assumed that cues were symmetrical in diagnosticity: the presence of a cue, 
e.g., thinking hard (TH), might correctly indicate honesty 75% of the time, and so 
symmetrically its absence correctly indicates dishonesty 75% of the time. But there 
may be an asymmetry. For instance, while the presence of the TH cue is taken as 
evidence in favour of honesty, the absence of the TH cue might simply be taken as an 
absence of evidence, in the same way as large p-values do not allow us to assess 
whether the evidence is in favour of the null (in this case, deception) or whether the 
evidence is not sufficiently powerful to make any conclusions. That is, the absence of 
a cue is no longer considered to be 75% indicative of deception ? rather, it is simply 
considered non-diagnostic. 
In this instance, there are two possibilities. First, people may switch to using 
another cue. Given the limited cognitive capacities in a complex world, people are 
often selective in what they bring into their judgment so as to reach a satisfactorily 
accurate decision (Brunswik, 1952; Simon, 1990; Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC 
Group, 1999). There is always some form of focussing or selective attention in play, 
guiding what in the environment is and is not to be processed. To put it crudely, the 
movement of the clouds won’t help you spot a liar. So one possibility is that people 
will simply shift their attention to more diagnostic indicators in place of the non-
diagnostic cue. Lie detectors do pay attention to and make use of the more diagnostic 
cues that are available in favour of the non-diagnostic ones (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). 
A second possibility is that they will incorporate non-diagnostic information 
into their judgment because it is a cue under the focus of attention. In this case, 
accuracy should decrease, in the same way as using both the 60% and 75% diagnostic 
cues in our worked example results in a lower accuracy compared to using the 75% 
diagnostic cue alone. Simply put, whether the cue influences the judgment will 
depend on whether the cue is brought to the focus of attention, either through internal 
selection mechanisms or through external prompting, such as we did in Experiment 2. 
A difficulty arises when there are no diagnostic indicators available. In the 
simplified example in the main text, this would mean that both the tense (TE) and TH 
cues do not offer diagnostic information, and those are the only cues available. The 
Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED: Street, 2015) proposes that people will rely on more 
generalised information that are more indirectly related to whether the statement is 
true or false (e.g., how often people in general tell the truth). That is beyond the 
explanatory scope of the focal account, but ALIED argues that raters would use their 
beliefs about how often people tell the truth to make an informed guess. Regardless of 
whether the absence of a cue is taken as a lack of evidence or as positive evidence in 
favour of deception, if the TH cue is not believed to be less diagnostic than it actually 
is and if it is the most diagnostic cue available, accuracy should be lower than what 
could have been achieved if the cue had been taken into consideration. 
Cue co-dependence. Are cues typically likely to occur together and be absent 
together? There is no data we are aware of that explores the correlation between 
behavioral cues to deception. However, it is evident that people are skilled liars 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Duran, Dale, Kello, Street & Richardson, 2013; Van Der 
Zee, Poppe, Taylor & Anderson, 2015) and give very few cues to their deceptions 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007), if any at all (see Levine, 
2014). It is also well known that cues to deception are highly probabilistic and largely 
unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003). We should also consider whether the behaviors of 
truth-tellers are correlated. People are better at detecting truths than lies (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Levine, Park & McCornack, 1999), perhaps resulting from the 
tendency to believe ‘the truth will out’ (Gilovich, Savitsky & Medvec, 1998; Hartwig, 
Granhag & Strömwall, 2007; Kassin, 2005) – as such, these people may not structure 
and control their behavior in the ways that liars do (Duran et al., 2013). Thus we 
might expect the behaviors of truth-tellers to be more correlated than those of liars. In 
the case of lie detection, then, we might expect relatively little correlation between 
cues, which would make lie detection more difficult than truth detection, consistent 
with research (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Levine et al., 1999). 
In the main body of text, Figure 1 depicts the situation when two cues are 
independent: the probabilities are multiplied. But if two cues were perfectly positively 
dependent, this would mean that the presence of one cue would guarantee the 
presence of the other cue. If they were perfectly negatively dependent, the presence of 
one would guarantee the absence of the other. In either case, one cue would be 
entirely redundant, and so accuracy should be dependent on the diagnosticity of the 
one cue. 
The account can only explain situations where the cues are not perfectly 
correlated. If they were, there would be no room for the two cues to contradict one 
another. In Experiment 1a, we report a correlation of r = .46 between the TH and TE 
cues – there is a dependency, but there is room for conflict also. One might argue that 
the perfect scenario would be that on those occasions where the more diagnostic cue 
suggested the wrong judgment, the other cue would be perfectly diagnostic. This way, 
either one or the other cue would be able to tell us on any given occasion whether the 
person is lying or telling the truth. Although this is true, the problem for the person 
making the decision is that they are unlikely to know whether it is the TH or TE cue 
that is diagnostic on this particular occasion. Which cue should they choose to use, or 
which one should they weight more heavily when they combine them into a single 
judgment, if either? Raters would have to know which of the two cues is diagnostic 
on this particular statement,1 because combining the cues would reduce their joint 
diagnosticity. The focal account claims simply that combining multiple probabilistic 
cues raises the dilemma of having to deal with conflicting information, and this is 
what reduces explicit lie detection accuracy. 
Guessing under uncertainty. We made the simplifying assumption that when 
the cues are in conflict, raters make an unbiased guess. But there may be reasons why 
people are biased to use one cue more than another. For instance, salient cues can 
have a powerful influence on the decision process, as we noted in the motivation for 
                                                
1
 There may be some other cue the speaker produces that indicates whether the TH or 
TE cue is more diagnostic on this occasion, a sort of meta-cue. For simplicity we 
make the assumption that there either is no such cue or at the very least the rater does 
not notice this cue. The presence and use of such a cue would be problematic for the 
focal account. 
Experiment 2 (e.g., Nisbett et al., 1981; Platzer & Bröder, 2012). The more salient cue 
may take precedence in the case of a cue conflict. For instance, the presence of a cue 
is likely to be more salient than the absence of a cue. And visual cues are more salient 
than verbal cues (Stiff et al., 1989). The focal account would predict that the more 
salient information should have the larger impact on the judgment. Experiment 2 
manipulates this and shows that saliency of a cue does lead to that cue having heavier 
weighting in the judgment. It is an open question whether such saliency effects come 
into play when two cues conflict and a judgment must be reached. ALIED theory 
(Street, 2015) and the ‘Big Five’ of truth judgments (Schwarz, 2015) would predict 
such generalised pieces of information could be used to help overcome this 
uncertainty due to cue conflict. 
Saliency is only one way in which the rater may attempt to overcome the issue 
of cue conflict. Raters may more heavily rate one cue than another under cue conflict, 
depending on their long-run diagnosticity, for instance. Or they may simply pick one 
cue and ignore all others in a non-compensatory fashion. If the cue selected is 75% 
diagnostic, then accuracy should also be 75%, regardless of what other cues are 
present. Although there is some evidence that people pick one piece of information to 
base their judgments on (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Kleinbölting, 1991), the evidence is 
compromised by the fact that they only do so when they are not free to choose their 
own decision strategies (Bröder, 2000; Newell & Shanks, 2003; Newell et al., 2003). 
So an assumption we make is that people do in fact attend to a variety of cues and 
integrate them to form their judgment. This is known as a compensatory strategy 
because the various cues are weighted and combined to form a single judgment (e.g. 
Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Newell & Shanks, 2004; Pohl, 
2006; Richter & Späth, 2006), as opposed to a non-compensatory strategy that uses 
only one cue and ignores the others. The compensatory-strategy assumption is not 
entirely unchallenged, however (see Street, Bischof, Vadillo & Kingstone, 2015, for 
an inability of either strategy to better predict lie-truth judgments; also see Pohl, 2011, 
for a review of the debate). We are unable to distinguish these two possibilities with 
the current data. To our knowledge, only one study has attempted to distinguish these 
two accounts in the lie detection literature (Street, Bischof, Vadillo & Kingstone, 
2015). They found neither strategy predicted lie-truth judgments particularly well, and 
neither strategy stood out as clearly better than the other in accounting for the data. So 
the jury is still out. 
Cue strength. On a related note, we made the simplifying assumption that the 
presence of two cues is taken as strong enough evidence to trigger a lie or truth 
judgment. When they conflict there ought to be indecision. But when they 
complement a lie or truth judgment is favored. If the cues are weakly diagnostic, 
combining two complementary weak cues may not be enough evidence to trigger a lie 
or a truth judgment, and so may still result in indecision (or result in a truth decision, 
if people default to believing others are telling the truth: Levine, 2014). In such a 
case, it might be predicted that although there is indecision, there is still more 
evidence in favor of one judgment over another and so if forced to guess raters may 
rely on that partial evidence to make a judgment (Street, 2015; Street & Richardson, 
2015). Potentially, then, the effect of cue contradiction reducing accuracy could be 
alleviated by allowing raters to abstain from judgment. This is not a core prediction of 
the focal account, but it is consistent with the logic. 
 The relationship between focal cues. We also only considered the presence of 
two cues. If there were many weak cues that complemented one another we would 
expect high accuracy, in exactly the same way as a single strong cue in isolation 
would give high accuracy (see Christiansen, Conway & Curtin, 2005, for a proof of 
principle in the field of psycholinguistics). Of course, if those weak cues did not 
complement one another we would predict indecision, just as we predicted for 
competing cues in Experiment 1. So far it seems the account would predict the same 
outcomes regardless of the amount of cues present. But there is an exception. A 
compensatory strategy that we assume allows a set of low-diagnostic cues that 
complement each other (e.g., all suggesting deception) to overpower a single high-
diagnostic cue in the other direction (e.g., one cue suggesting honesty), or to balance 
and so cancel each other out. If on a single trial there are three cues with a low 
weighting of -0.25, all suggesting deception, and there is a cue with a higher 
weighting of +0.75 in favor of a truth judgment, then additively combining the cues 
would result in total indecision ((-0.25 x 3) + 0.75). Although there are more 
numerous cues suggesting deception rather than honesty, indecision should result and 
accuracy should be low. A challenge for the focal account, and compensatory lie 
detection strategies more generally, is to show that the presence of many low-
diagnostic cues can overpower a highly diagnostic cue. As discussed previously, there 
is already some evidence of this (Bond et al., 2013; Duffy & Feltovich, 2006). 
Summary. As can be seen, the focal account as it currently stands makes a 
number of simplifications, and it requires further empirical work to clarify how direct 
lie detectors cope with uncertainty in the environment. We believe it is important for 
lie detection researchers to start considering how people tackle this uncertainty, 
because it is clear that there are no highly reliable cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 
2003). It has received little attention, as in part evidenced by the lack of detail that the 
focal account can offer in regards to how people make judgments when the cues 
conflict. 
When (and When Not) To Use Multiple Cues 
It is possible that people incorrectly weight the cues. Cues might be taken as 
weak evidence when they actually have high diagnostic value. Or the cue might be 
highly diagnostic when it is present, but it is so rarely present that it is given a low 
weighting in the judgment. We assumed that raters veridically perceive the 
diagnosticity of the cue. This assumption places a boundary on the scope of the 
account. Should participants be found to incorrectly weigh the available cues, 
accuracy may not increase. Nonetheless, the judgment should be guided by those 
more heavily weighed cues. 
In these circumstances, it would be beneficial to incorporate other available 
cues, provided that those other available cues are more diagnostic than the cue already 
under focus. Consider our experiments here, as well as those of the indirect lie 
detection paradigm more generally. The cue that is being focused upon is chosen by 
the experimenter because it is known to be a useful indicator of deception. This sets 
the bar high. But imagine that in our study the TH cue has a long-run diagnosticity of 
70% and the TE cue has a long-run diagnosticity of 80%. If the cue under focus is not 
the most diagnostic of the two cues, then accuracy would be worse (70%) than what 
could have been achieved by integrating the two cues (56% + 19% = 75%). So the 
diagnosticity of the cue selected for focusing must be the most diagnostic of all the 
cues under consideration if we are to see an improvement in accuracy. Similarly, 
focusing on a cue that is more indicative of honesty should lead to more truth 
judgments compared to focusing on a cue that is more indicative of deception, for the 
same reason. Experiment 2 demonstrated precisely this. In short, adding another cue 
into focus is useful when that new cue is more diagnostic than the currently focused 
cue. 
Competing Accounts 
This article sought to address one alternative to the implicit knowledge claim. 
There are other accounts that could also explain the indirect lie detection findings. 
First, the accusatory reluctance account (O’Sullivan, 2003; see also DePaulo & 
Rosenthal, 1979) claims people are biased towards rating others as truth-tellers 
because there are socializational rules and practices that discourage calling people 
liars. It may be that explicit lie detectors do not achieve the accuracy rates that are 
possible from the diagnostic cues presented because they are reluctant to explicitly 
call people liars. Our findings cannot rule out this possibility. However, it is first 
worth noting that our manipulations clearly influenced judgments, and that the 
evidence is consistent with our focal account. Unfortunately, there is little research 
that tests the accusatory reluctance account (see O’Sullivan, 2003). 
Of course, the focal and accusatory reluctance accounts are not mutually 
exclusive and both may contribute to the decreased accuracy. In that sense, it is not 
truly an alternative account. But one true alternative is that explicit raters perform 
poorly because they do not attend to any of the diagnostic cues available. That is, the 
cause of lower accuracy when making direct lie-truth judgments is not cue conflict, 
but cue ignorance. Our data cannot distinguish between these two possibilities. 
Do explicit lie detectors typically attend to diagnostic cues? It has long been 
thought that they do not, with research showing they have many misguided beliefs 
about the cues to deception (The Global Deception Research Team, 2006). However, 
in a set of Brunswikian lens-model meta-analyses, Hartwig and Bond (2011) have 
shown that despite what people self-report, the cues that contribute to their judgments 
tend to be of higher diagnosticity and those cues that do not contribute to their 
judgment. That is, people seem to be making use of the more diagnostic cues in 
reaching their judgment. Based on this evidence we would argue that people typically 
make use of diagnostic information when it is available. 
 
